Abstract. This paper characterizes how a target …rm should be sold when the possible buyers (bidders) have prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). We …nd that the optimal mechanism needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction which imposes a bias against bidders with high toeholds. This discriminatory procedure is so that the target's average sale price is increasing in both the size of the common toehold and the degree of asymmetry in these stakes. It is also shown that a simple mechanism of sequential negotiation replicates the main properties of the optimal procedure and yields a larger average selling price than the standard auctions commonly used in takeover battles.
Introduction
Auctions in which bidders have stakes in the seller's surplus are not rare in the real world, as there are many examples that resemble a bidding competition with vertical toeholds. Takeover contests provide one of the clearest illustrations, since block shareholders compete between them or with an outside investor to gain the control of a company, while the minority shareholders play the role of pure sellers. 1 In order to illustrate some of the features of takeover battles, consider the next real life example. In 2006, the Spanish tollway operator Europistas was the target of a takeover battle between two bidders. Firstly, the group Isolux Corsán submitted an o¤er for the 100% of the ownership, consisting of 4.8 euros per share. At this stage, Cintra, one of the principal block shareholders of the target …rm, attained an agreement with Isolux. According to the deal, Cintra committed itself to participate in this tender o¤er and sell, in an irrevocable way, its 27.1 per cent stake for a price of 5.13 euros per share. In less than 24 hours, a second buyer emerged: a bidding consortium formed by the constructor conglomerate Sacyr Vallehermoso and three Basque saving banks grouped in the society Telekutxa. While Isolux Corsán, was an outside bidder, Telekutxa held a 32.4 per cent stake in the capital of Europistas. The …nal tender o¤er of this consortium raised to 9.15 euros per share, that is, an improvement of 78.36% with respect to the …rst o¤er. This implied that Cintra was trapped in the pre-sale agreement reached with Isolux, which impeded it to take advantage of the substantially better tender o¤er made by the consortium led by Sacyr. Finally, Cintra paid 131 millions of euros to Isolux as a compensation to recover its freedom to sell its stake to the bidding consortium, which was the winner of the contest and thus, took over Europistas.
This case highlights some interesting issues. First, unlike standard auctions, the presence of vertical toeholds introduces countervailing incentives on bidders because they can get a payo¤ not only when they win, but also when they lose the auction. In fact, since the losing bidder owns a proportion of the seller's surplus, he cares about the payment received by the seller. In the context of a takeover battle, as the winner bidder must buy all the shares, losing transforms a bidder with a toehold into a minority seller. This implies that, conditional on losing, a toehold induces a more aggressive bidding behavior. In addition, holding stakes in the target …rm also means, by comparison with the outside bidders, lower costs of overbidding when winning, as the amount of shares to be bought is smaller. Consequently, toeholds strengthens the standard incentive to increase bids present in any auction, but now with the intention of selling at a higher price.
2 Second, the aforementioned Europistas case illustrates the large costs that an incorrect choice of selling procedure may impose on the nonbidding shareholders'wealth. 3 Nonbidding shareholders of a target company -by means of the board of directors or a special committee -should therefore pay attention to the selling mechanism to be used.
The auction literature has studied takeovers using di¤erent valuation environments, but assuming always that signals are independently distributed. The main conclusion is that the more aggressive bidding behavior induced by toeholds leads to the break-down of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Myerson 1981, Riley and Samuelson 1981) even when bidders possess symmetric stakes. As a result, the equivalence between standard auctions no longer holds, as several papers have shown. In particular, Singh (1998) when analyzing a game in which a toehold bidder and an outside bidder compete for gaining the control of a company in a private values framework has shown the superiority of the second-price auction over the …rst-price auction. The major insight stemming from his model is what he calls the owner's curse. According to this phenomenon, the higher aggressiveness of the toeholder is so that in the second-price auction he is (rationally) willing to bid more than his valuation. Since this overbidding behavior is absent in the …rst-price auction due to the traditional trade-o¤ present in this mechanism, the non-equivalence between both standard auctions emerges. 4 Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) also study a two-bidder takeover contest, but under a common value set-up.
5
They compare the sealed-bid …rst-price and the ascending-price (equivalent to the second-price one) auctions in both the symmetric and the asymmetric cases. They show that with symmetric toeholds, the ascending auction performs better than the …rst-price auction in terms of the expected selling price per share, in contrast, when analyzing the asymmetric case, they …nd the opposite result whenever toeholds are very asymmetric and su¢ ciently small.
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The current paper does also deal with the issue of how to run a takeover battle. But in sharp contrast with the previous literature, our work is, to the best of our knowledge, pioneering by adopting a normative approach rather than a positive one. That is, instead of taking a particular auction format as given for exogenous reasons, we analyze how the maximizing target price mechanism should be and how it could be implemented. To this end, our methodology follows the mechanism design approach, introduced by Myerson (1981) , within an independent private values framework.
Two main features of our model are the possibility of asymmetry among bidders' toeholds and the existence of a bidder without toeholds (outside bidder). The analysis performed here is in close connection with Loyola (2007) , a companion paper that characterizes the optimal mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings, i.e., toeholds in other bidders'pro…ts. In contrast with this case, we …nd that in the presence of vertical toeholds, the optimal allocation rule impose no bias against any bidder as the presence of vertical toeholds only links the bidders'payments, but not the bidders'valuations. As a consequence, a maximizing revenue seller prefers a symmetric equilibrium even though buyers hold asymmetric stakes. It is however shown that this optimal rule needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction. In particular, we prove that the implementation is possible through a second-price auction augmented with a reserve price and a scheme of asymmetric payments. The latter includes a penalty against the winner (with respect to the non-toehold case) and a payment by the loser whenever he is a toeholder-bidder. The reason for this apparent contradiction between the allocation rule and the scheme of payments is the same as that behind the failure of the Revenue Equivalence Principle. That is, the presence of toeholds implies the impossibility of fully characterizing the revenues based only on the allocation rule and the payment made by the lowest-type bidder. With toeholds, the entire system of transfers plays a role to characterize revenues.
Our discriminatory policy has the following rationale. By imposing a heavier bias against the toeholder-bidder, the optimal mechanism extracts more surplus from the strongest player of the game. In the context of takeovers, this advantaged player corresponds to the raider who bids more aggressively due to his larger stake in the target. As a result, the discriminatory rule pays to the seller, as we show that the expected selling price is increasing in both the common toehold (the symmetric case) and the degree of asymmetry in these stakes (the asymmetric case).
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In addition, we show that a sequential negotiation procedure replicates the main properties of the optimal mechanism. This negotiation-based procedure sets an agenda of take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers that provides priority to the more aggressive bidder, i.e., the toeholder, and thus yields a larger target's expected sale price than both the …rst-price and the second-price auctions. 8 The last result is in line with the established superiority of sequential mechanisms which give priority to stronger bidders. Povel and Singh (2006) , for instance, analyze takeover contests under a general value setting that allows both private and common value environments. They characterize the optimal selling procedure that a target company should design when it faces two outside bidders (without toeholds) who are asymmetrically informed. Interestingly, Povel and Singh also conclude about the optimality of imposing a heavier bias against the strongest bidder (the better-informed one) by means of a two-stage procedure. Similarly, Dasgupta and Tsui (2003) examine in an interdependent value setting the properties of the "matching auction", a sequential procedure where the …rst mover is also the strong bidder. In their model, the strong player can be either the largertoehold bidder or the better-informed one. As with our sequential procedure, Dasgupta and Tsui also …nd that the matching auction allows the target's seller to obtain a higher expected transaction price than with the standard auctions, but only when asymmetry is su¢ ciently large. An important di¤erence between the last two papers and ours, apart from the valuation environment adopted, lies in the mechanism itself, which implies bidders'participation strategies of di¤er-ent nature. Povel and Singh (2006) propose a hybrid sequential procedure that combines standard auctions and exclusive deals. Similarly, in the auction-based mechanism studied by Dasgupta and Tsui (2003) , the …rst mover bidder follows actively a bid strategy, whereas the second one only decides about matching or not this bid. In contrast, our procedure is based upon a scheme of take-it or leave-it o¤ers made by the seller so that all bidders are in some sense passive players. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up a model of takeover contests in the presence of toeholds. In Section 3, the optimal selling mechanism is 7 This revenue-increasing property of an optimal discriminatory policy has also been found in contests with asymmetric informed buyers (see Singh 2004, Povel and Singh 2006) . 8 In the light of this …nding, the Europistas case provides then a clear example of how things should not be done when selling a target …rm in which one of the shareholders could become a bidder. Of course, in this case the nonbidding shareholder (Cintra) chose incorrectly to negotiate and close a deal …rstly with the outside bidder (Isolux) instead of doing it previously with the toehold bidder (the consortium). In this paper we show that an appropriate sequential negotiation mechanism should take the opposed order of negotiations. characterized and its main properties are established. In Section 4, we propose a simple negotiation procedure that replicates most of these properties. The next section compares this negotiation-based mechanism with the auction formats commonly used in practice. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and stress some policy implications. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
The Model
The nonbidding shareholders of a target company (the seller), represented by the board of directors or a special committee, face a takeover threat from two possible risk-neutral buyers (the bidders). The value of the target to bidder i is t i , which is private information, but it is common knowledge that it is independently and identically drawn according to c.d.f. F with support t; t , density f and hazard rate H(
Denote the value that the initial shareholders assign to the target company by t 0 , which is common knowledge and is here normalized to zero.
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A toehold of bidder i is de…ned as a partial participation of this bidder in the seller's surplus, or, equivalently, a partial participation in the ownership of the target company. We assume that bidder 1 has a larger initial stake in the seller's surplus than bidder 2. The parameter i represents the share of bidder i in the seller's surplus. Thus, (1 1 2 ) represents the participation of the seller in her surplus. Toeholds are assumed common knowledge, with 1=2 > 1 2 0.
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We will also refer to the players as follows: a bidder with toehold as a bidding shareholder (or toeholder bidder), a bidder without toehold as an outside bidder (or non-toeholder bidder) and the seller as the nonbidding shareholder. Given this ownership structure, we interpret t 0 as the common value that all shareholders assign to the …rm when they own it partially. In other words, t 0 represents the value that all shareholders assign to the …rm under the current management, i.e., either before the takeover takes place or when this process is …nally unsuccessful. 9 As it is standard in auction theory, we concentrate on the regular case, that is, increasing hazard rates.
10 As we will see below, the seller may not be an exclusive initial owner. 11 Notice that this formulation allows the presence of an outside bidder (non-toeholder), which is precisely the case analyzed in Section 5, given its predominance in actual takeovers. Bradley et al. (1988) …nd that 66% of the bidders in their sample of 236 successful tender o¤ers have zero toeholds, while Betton and Eckbo (2000) …nd that 47% of initial bidders in their sample of over 1,300 tender o¤ers (including failed ones) have zero toeholds (see Goldman and Qian (2005) ).
In contrast, we understand t i as the private value that bidder i assigns to the target when he owns it fully. In consequence t i can be interpreted as a private synergy that bidder i can exploit when he wins the contest and obtains the absolute control of the company. It is also called the value "to run the …rm".
12 Implicit in this interpretation is the assumption that the takeovers modeled in the present paper are not partial. That is, all shareholders must sell their stakes to the winning contestant (and he must buy it) according to the price stated by the contest's rules.
The Optimal Mechanism
Due to to the revelation principle, we only need to focus on direct revelation mechanisms. Denote the vector of signals realizations by t, i.e., t = (t 1 ; t 2 ), and similarly, denote by t i the vector of signal realizations of all bidders except bidder i. Let T and T i be the support of t and t i , respectively.
13 De…ne p i (t) as the probability with which the optimal mechanism allocates the target company to bidder i, conditional on the vector of reported signal realizations t, and, de…ne x i (t) as the transfer from bidder i to the seller, conditional on the same vector. Let Q i (t i ) be bidder i's conditional probability of winning given that his type is
on signal t i and announcement b t i , is then given by
for all t i ; b t i 2 t; t and for i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j. We de…ne the bidder i's truthtelling payo¤ as V i (t i ) U i (t i =t i ) and the seller's expected revenue when all bidders report their true type as follows
12 Alternatively, since we have normalized t 0 = 0, t i can be interpreted as an incremental cash ‡ow generated by the new control and management under bidder i (See Singh, 1998) . 13 In our set-up t i is just t j : We have opted for the notation t i as the characterization of the optimal mechanism can be easily extended to the case of more than two bidders. For the three bidder case (two asymmetric toeholders and one outside bidder) the characterization can be obtained from the author upon request.
Let us de…ne c i (t i ), the bidder i's marginal revenue, 16 as
Following Myerson (1981) (see more details in the Appendix), it can be shown that the optimal mechanism solves the following problem:
where (3) is a su¢ cient condition for bidder i's participation constraint to hold, (4) is a su¢ cient condition for the incentive compatibility constraints of the bidders to hold and (5) corresponds to the feasibility constraints.
Optimal allocation rule
Lemma 3.1 The optimal mechanism sets V i (t) = 0 and
for all i, and for all t 2 T .
Note that bidder i's marginal revenue is larger than bidder j's if and only if
) for all i 6 = j. In addition, let us de…ne t i c 1 i (0) as the threshold signal for which bidder i's marginal revenue is larger than the seller's. Since c i is well-behaved, so it is its inverse function, and thus it is equivalent to say that the optimal mechanism sets V i (t) = 0 and
Lemma 3.1 establishes that, in the presence of vertical toeholds, the optimal allocation rule is not a discriminatory one as the policy function satis…es that z ij (t j ) = t j as c i (:) = c(:) for all bidders.
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This implies that even though bidders possess asymmetric toeholds, it is revenue maximizing for the nonbidding shareholders to o¤er them the same chances of winning whenever they report the same signal value. This result is surprising because one would expect that, since a vertical toehold induces a more aggressive bidding behavior, the seller should take it into account to design the optimal rule. Our interpretation is that, in contrast with horizontal crossholdings (see Loyola 2006) , vertical toeholds only impose links between the bidders' payments, but not between the bidders' valuations. Consequently, in the terminology of Bulow and Roberts (1989) , the marginal revenue function (which depends only on valuations) is the same for all bidders. This implies that the seller perceives all bidders as symmetric players, and hence, it is optimal to impose no bias and to attain a symmetric equilibrium.
However, as we will see in the next subsection, this optimal symmetric equilibrium requires the seller to introduce an asymmetry in the payment scheme. The underlying rationale for this apparent contradiction between the allocation rule and the scheme of transfers is the same as the one behind the break-down of the Revenue Equivalence Principle. That is, when there exists toeholds, revenues do depend on the entire payment scheme, not only on the transfers made by the lowest type bidder. As a result, it does not su¢ ce to examine only the allocation rule to state the properties of the optimal mechanism. In fact, one needs to characterize fully the payment scheme as this is crucial to recognize the non-standard and discriminatory nature of the optimal selling procedure.
Implementation
Since all bidders provide the same marginal revenue, the implementation of the optimal allocation rule requires a scheme of payments that induce an e¢ cient allocation, that is, that guarantee that the target …rm be awarded to the bidder who values it the most. Since we have assumed that players are asymmetric in their toeholds, and thus in their expected payo¤ functions, the only way to attain an e¢ cient allocation is to design a scheme of "personalized"payments. This implies that we must rule out any standard auction, as it imposes symmetric payments to the players and thus results in an asymmetric and ine¢ cient equilibrium. This fact is formalized in the next corollary.
Corollary 3.1 A standard auction can not implement the optimal selling mechanism.
From the incentive compatible constraint, we show next that the optimal allocation rule can be implemented by a selling mechanism with an asymmetric scheme of transfers.
Proposition 3.1 In the presence of toeholds, the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a modi…ed second price auction with a reserve price and a scheme of payments that includes a penalty against the winner and a payment by the loser. This scheme is the following one:
if p i (t) = 0 and p j (t) = 1 0 otherwise for all i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j, and for all t 2 T , where
,
This scheme of payments has the following properties.
Discriminatory policy with winning penalties and losing payments. First, since z i (t i ) > 0 and i 1, this implies that when the winner is some bidder with toeholds, his payment has a penalty when comparing to the payment he would make in case of holding no toeholds. This penalty is given by
. Second, since z j (t j ) > 0, and i 0, this means that when the loser is some bidder with an initial stake, his payment is positive. Third, from 1 > 2 , it follows that 1 > 2 and 1 > 2 . Thus, it is clear that the scheme of transfers proposed imposes a discriminatory policy with a bias against the bidder with the largest initial stake.
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19 Moreover, this discriminatory policy gets exacerbated with the degree of asymmetry, as the gaps of both winning penalties and losing payments are increasing with the di¤erence in toeholds.
Truthtelling and e¢ cient mechanism. The discriminatory scheme of winning penalties and losing payments implies that the payo¤ of bidders 1 and 2 simpli…es to
The scheme of transfers induces therefore symmetric objective functions for all bidders, as in the standard problem when there are no toeholds (see Myerson 1981) .
Average sale price increasing with common toeholds and asymmetry. First, let 0 be the seller's expected revenue under the optimal mechanism, and hence, de…ne 0 0 =( 1 1 2 ), the average sale price under the same procedure. From (1) and Proposition 3.1, it follows directly that 0 , and thus 0 , are increasing with both the winning penalty and the losing payment. Second, consider the symmetric toeholds case (i.e. 1 = 2 = > 0). In this case, both the winner's penalty and the loser's payment are increasing in the common toehold, as it is easy to check that @ i =@ > 0 and @ i =@ > 0 for all i. All of this implies that, at the optimal mechanism, the seller's expected revenue (and thereby, the average sale price) is increasing with the size of common toeholds. Finally, consider the asymmetric toeholds case (i.e. 1 > 2 > 0). Let us de…ne " 1 2 , so that the parameters of the winning penalty and the losing payment can be rewritten as
Hence, it is easy to verify that @ i =@" > 0 and @ i =@" > 0 for all i. Therefore, the optimal mechanism is so that the seller's expected revenue (and thus, the average sale price) is increasing with the degree of asymmetry in toeholds. All of this implies that a discriminatory policy pays to the seller.
A sequential negotiation procedure
In this section we show that a simple sequential negotiation procedure replicates the main properties of the optimal mechanism. The negotiation procedure works as follows:
Stage I I.1. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er 1 to bidder 1, where the o¤er i is the price to be paid by bidder i for the target shares.
I.2. Bidder 1 accepts or rejects this o¤er. If he accepts, the target is sold to him and the game is over. If bidder 1 rejects the exclusive deal, negotiation moves to the next round.
Stage II
II.1. The seller makes a new take-it-or-leave-it o¤er 2 to bidder 2.
II.2. Bidder 2 accepts or rejects this o¤er. If he accepts, the target is sold to him. Otherwise, the target company remains under the current ownership structure and management.
Next proposition illustrates the discrimination policy resulting from the negotiation procedure for the uniformly distributed valuations case.
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Proposition 4.1 Suppose that t i is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1] for all i = 1; 2. At the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the sequential negotiation procedure, it is optimal for the seller to set 1 > 2 for all 1 2
0.
With sequential negotiations the sale price charged to the …rst bidder is larger than the one charged to the second bidder. As the …rst-mover is the buyer with the highest toehold, the sequential mechanism discriminates against him. Moreover, the degree of this bias increases with the degree of asymmetry in toeholds. More precisely, if we de…ne the degree of asymmetry by " 1 2 , then the di¤erence in prices o¤ered by the seller ,i.e., ( 2 ; ") 1 2 ; is increasing in ": To see this note that
Note also that ( 2 ; ") is strictly increasing in 1 and strictly decreasing in 2 ; with ( 2 ; ") strictly increasing in 2 for …xed and given ": The negotiation procedure hence highlights the importance of establishing an asymmetric scheme of payments, as the price charged to the high-toehold bidder exceeds that of the low-toehold one, and this bias is larger when the ownership stakes become more asymmetric.
To analyze if this price discrimination policy pays to the seller we must look at the average sale price delivered by the equilibrium of the sequential procedure. Let SN 0 be the seller's expected revenue under the sequential procedure, and consequently, de…ne
2 ), the average sale price under the same mechanism.
21 Rewriting SN 0 in terms of " = 1 2 , it follows that
It is easy to verify that @ SN 0 =@" > 0 for all 2 ; " 2 (0; 1=2) so that the average sale price is increasing in the degree of asymmetry. This result is displayed in Figure 1 . Furthermore, similarly to the optimal mechanism in the symmetric case, the aforede…ned sequential procedure yields an average sale price which is also increasing in the common toehold. In fact, when 1 = 2 = , it is possible to check that @ SN 0 =@ > 0 for all 2 (0; 1=2), as it is illustrated in Figure 2 . 21 See the Appendix (Proof of Proposition 4.1) for details on how this average price is computed. Notice however that unlike the optimal mechanism described in the previous section, the sequential procedure always discriminates against the …rst-mover bidder, even if the toeholds are symmetric or zero. In fact, as the proof of Proposition 4.1 establishes, the prices charged to both players in the symmetric case (i.e., 1=2 > 1 = 2 = 0) satisfy the following inequality
In addition, the di¤erent priorities given by the negotiation timetable to di¤erent buyers implies that, unlike the optimal procedure, the sequential mechanism may be ex post ine¢ cient.
In sum, and despite these di¤erences, our sequential procedure replicates the two most important properties of the optimal mechanism: the expected selling price is increasing in both the common toehold and the degree of asymmetry in the initial stakes held by bidders.
Sequential procedure vs. auctions
Although there is not a speci…c practice to sell a company, sometimes the legal framework implicitely induces the board of directors to conduct an auction among the raiders. 22 The underlying rationale behind this recommendation is the idea that an auction run with several bidders at once o¤er an environment more competitive than a negotiation held with a single buyer at each round. Nevertheless, and despite this idea, it has been widely documented the coexistence of both type of mechanisms in real world takeover processes. 23 In this Section we compare the sequential procedure to the auction formats commonly used in practice from the nonbidding shareholders' point of view. We show that the nonbidding shareholders bene…t from the discrimination policy at the extent that the sequential procedure generates a higher expected selling price than both the …rst-price and the second-price auctions.
We here analyze two ownership structures in which this result holds: (i) the symmetric case, i.e. 1 = 2 = 0, and (ii) a particular asymmetric case in which there are two class of bidders: one toeholder and one outsider, i.e.
24 For both of these ownership structures, the literature provides a ranking between the …rst and second price formats. In the second-price auction, and for both ownership environments, the toeholder bidder exhibits the owner's curse, an overbidding behavior according to which the equilibrium bid exceeds his valuation. This overbidding phenomenon is however not present in the case of the outside raider, as bidding his true valuation continues to be a dominant strategy for him. In contrast, given the traditional bidding trade-o¤ present in the …rst-price auction, the owner's curse is absent in this selling format. Because of this, the second-price auction outperforms in terms of revenue the …rst-price auction, in both the symmetric and asymmetric structures.
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As a result, it su¢ ces to compare the selling price generated by the sequential mechanism with that generated by the second-price auction.
The following auxiliary result characterizes the expected selling price in the secondprice auction.
Lemma 5.1 Let SP A 0 be the average sale price resulting from the second-price auction. Then, 22 For instance, the Delaware law in US establishes that the board must act as "auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company". See also Cramton and Schwartz (1991) . 23 See the evidence provided by Boone and Mulherin (2003) , Boone and Mulherin (2004) , Povel and Singh (2006) , and Bulow and Klemperer (2007) . 24 As the evidence presented by Bradley et al. (1988) , Betton and Eckbo (2000) , and Betton Eckbo and Thorburn (2005) suggests, the presence of an outside bidder is very common in actual takeovers.
25 Ettinger (2002) performs this comparison for the symmetric case, and Ettinger (2005) does it for the speci…c asymmetric environment analyzed here.
(1) In the symmetric case, this price is given by
(2) In the asymmetric case, it corresponds to
Now, we stablish the predominance of our sequential mechanism over the auction formats commonly used in practice, irrespective of the degree of symmetry in toeholds.
Proposition 5.1 The sequential procedure generates a larger average sale price than both the …rst-price and the second-price auctions, no matter the degree of asymmetry.
As mentioned in the previous section, the sequential procedure always discriminates against the …rst-mover bidder. This fact implies that it yields a larger expected sale price than both auction formats in the symmetric case, even when there are no toeholds at all. The average sale price comparison for the symmetric case between the second-price auction and our sequential mechanism is depicted in Figure 3 . Note from the …gure that the second-price auction induces a concave average sale price whereas the negotiation procedure exhibits a convex one. As a result, the price gap between both mechanisms is larger when the toehold becomes su¢ ciently low or su¢ ciently high. The di¤erence attains its minimum for values around :25. Furthermore, the superiority of our sequential mechanism over auctions is exacerbated in the asymmetric case, as the discriminatory policy involves a sequence of negotiations with a pecking order consistent with the aggressiveness of each buyer (see Figure 4) . Notice that the clear advantage of the sequential mechanism becomes larger when the degree of asymmetry (represented in this case by 1 ) increases. This is consequence of the fact that whereas SN 0 is always an increasing and convex function in 1 , SP A 0 is a concave function and an increasing one only for a degree of asymmetry su¢ ciently low (for all 1 < :38).
This last result is formalized in the following statement.
Corollary 5.1 The larger the degree of asymmetry, the better is the sequential procedure when compared with both the …rst-price and the second-price auctions.
Finally, let us mention that our results here are in line with the well-established supremacy of sequential mechanisms which give higher priority to stronger bidders.
26 Accordingly, and in contrast to the standard auction formats, the particular order of negotiations involved in our procedure allows to exploit the higher aggressiveness of raiders with larger stakes in the target.
Concluding Remarks
We have characterized how a target …rm should be sold when bidders possess prior stakes in its ownership. This optimal mechanism corresponds to a nonstandard auction with a scheme of asymmetric payments that imposes a bias against toeholders. The rationale of such a discriminatory policy is the fact that a standard mechanism is unable to induce a symmetric and e¢ cient allocation rule, as it preserves the initial advantage of toehold bidders. In contrast, a scheme of asymmetric winning penalties and losing payments allows both to take advantage of the higher aggressiveness of toeholders and to go back to a symmetric environment.
The presence of losing payments in the optimal procedure is in line with similar results found in the literature devoted to characterize optimal auctions when there exist externalities. For instance, Goeree et al. (2005) show that the positive externalities present in fund-raising activities lead to discard winner-pay auctions in favor of all-pay formats. In a result reminiscent of ours, they establish the optimality of an auction with a reserve price and payments by the losers -a mix between participation fees and an all-pay auction run in a subsequent stage-, which depend on the degree of the externality. Moreover, Goeree et al. (2005) emphasize that some characteristics of this optimal procedure are present in the procedures used for raising funds in the real world. As a consequence, the characteristics 26 See Povel and Singh (2006) and Dasgupta and Tsui (2003) .
of our non-standard auction in the takeover case are not far away from those exhibited by the optimal procedure in other contests with externalities.
We have also demonstrated that the nonbidding shareholders bene…t from the discriminatory mechanism, as the target average sale price is increasing in both the common toehold and the degree of asymmetry in these stakes. The latter …nding is in sharp contrast with the properties of standard auction formats in takeover battles, which hence lead to opposite policy implications. For instance, Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) show that in general the asymmetry in toeholds lowers prices in common-value ascending auctions. As a result, they recommend the "level the playing …eld" practice, according to which it may be revenue increasing to sell very cheaply toeholds to the buyer with the smaller stake in the target. On the contrary, our normative approach suggests that the seller should follow strategies with the aim of preserving this asymmetry. Accordingly, the board of directors should block or discourage the entrance of new shareholders suspect of becoming competitors against the incumbent toeholder in a future takeover battle.
As an alternative for the optimal non-standard auction-based mechanism, we have proposed a simpler and realistic negotiation procedure that replicates the main properties of the …rst one. This mechanism contains a timetable that gives priority to the higher toehold bidders, but charges larger prices to them. Such a negotiation-based procedure shares some features of other selling procedures already considered in the literature. In particular, it balances out properly the trade-o¤ between creation and extraction of value caused by the implicit threats involved in the sequential nature of the negotiation process. This characteristic is also present in the posted-price rule discussed by Campbell and Levin (2006) in an environment with interdependent valuations. These authors …nd conditions under which an hybrid mechanism of a posted-price rule and a random rationing may outperform standard auctions. This fact occurs essentially when the increase of all buyers'willingness to pay o¤sets the losses stemming from ex post ine¢ cient allocations. Similarly, in the context of our paper, the individual and sequential feature of the negotiation scheme imposes costs and bene…ts on nonbidding shareholders. On the one hand, the expected target price decreases due to both less competition and less e¢ ciency. On the other hand, the higher priority given to the high-toehold bidder increases its willingness to pay, as it emerges the opportunity of winning the contest even though their value may be lower than the small-toehold bidder's one. We have proved that the last e¤ect dominates the shortcomings, keeping therefore open the ongoing debate on auctions versus negotiations in takeover wars.
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responds to the feasibility constraints.
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From Myerson (1981) , standard substitutions and computations lead to state the equivalence between the incentive compatibility constraints and the following two consitions (i)
These conditions allow to replace (9) by (ii) and
Similarly, (8) is guaranteed to hold if V i (t) 0 for all i. Hence, straightforward computations allow us to rewrite the seller's expected payo¤ and to simplify the maximization problem as presented in Section 3.
for all i. Substitute Q i (s i ) into (11), change the order of integration and substitute V i (t i ). After rearranging, we obtain that the truthtelling payo¤ of the bidder with the lowest signal can be written as
for all i and t i 2 t; t . Since it is optimal V i (t) = 0 for all i, then su¢ cient conditions for (14) to hold are:
for all i and for all state t = (t i ; t i ). If we …x a particular state t = (t i ; t i ), three cases are possible: (i) a winning bidder exists di¤erent from bidder 3, (ii) bidder 3 is the winner, and (iii) the object is not awarded to any bidder. Applying (??) and (??), the solution of this system of equations for the three cases yields the desired scheme of asymmetric payments.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Using backward induction, we …rst characterize the Nash equilibrium resulting from Stage II. In this stage, bidder 2 accepts the o¤er if t 2 (1 2 ) 2 > 0, i.e., if t 2 > (1 2 ) 2 , and rejects otherwise. The seller's problem is hence max
whose solution is given by 2 = 1=2(1 2 ). The optimal seller's expected revenue from this stage is equal to (1 1 2 )=4(1 2 ). In stage I.2, bidder 1 accepts any seller's o¤er if his expected payo¤ is larger than the expected payo¤ at the equilibrium of stage II. That is, if t 1 (1
, which is equivalent to the condition t 1 > ( 1 =4(1 2 )) + (1 1 ) 1 . Thus, the seller's optimal o¤er is characterized by
The solution is given by 1 = (5 6 2 )=8(1 1 )(1 2 ), which yields an optimal seller's expected revenue equal to
and an average sale price equal to
Since 1=2 > 1 2 0, it is simple to verify that
which proves the statement of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Since that the asymmetric case is the most general one, we …rst prove the second part of the proposition. In the second-price auction, bidder 2's payo¤ function, when his signals is t 2 and he behaves as if it were b t 2 , is given by 2 (t 2 ; b t 2 ) = max
that is, the traditional payo¤ function in a second-price auction without toeholds. Consequently, it follows that b 2 (t 2 ) = t 2 . Given the bid strategies b 1 (:) and b 2 (t 2 ) = t 2 , bidder 1's optimal choice of b t 1 when he observes t 1 is obtained by maximizing his expected pro…ts 1 (t 1 ; b t 1 ) = max
From Ettinger (2005) , bidder 1's equilibrium bid is given by b 1 (t 1 ) = 1 1 + 1 + t 1 1 + 1 Now, in order to compute the seller's revenues, let us de…ne j (t i ), the equilibrium correspondence function, such that b i (t i ) = b j ( j (t i )) for all i; j = 1; 2. Applying the de…nition of j (:) to the equilibrium bid strategies yields 2 (t 1 ) =
1 (t 2 ) = 1 + t 2 (1 + 1 ):
Appealing to the Envelope Theorem, and using the fact that 2 (:) = b 1 (:) and 1 (:) = b 1 1 (b 2 (:)), it can be veri…ed that
for all i; j = 1; 2. Evaluating t i = 1 in (16) and (17), and using the fact that in equilibrium j ( b t i ) = j (t i ) and j (1) = 1, it can be shown that
2 (1) = 1 2(1 + 1 ) :
Substituting (18), (19), and the results (21) and (22) into (20), bidder i's interim payo¤ becomes 1 (t 1 ) = 1
(1 1 ) 2
(1 t We now turn to demonstrate the statement for the symmetric case. From Proposition 1 in Ettinger (2002) , the second-price auction equilibrium bid is given by b i (t i ) = 1 + + t i 1 + for all i. Hence, 2 (t) = 1 (t) = t for all t. Applying the same line of reasoning used in the asymmetric case, it can be veri…ed that the seller's expected revenues are given by where the last inequality holds as overbidding is not present in the …rst-price auction.
